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Commodity Policy, Price Incentives, and
the Growth in Per-Acre Yields
William E. Foster and Bruce A, Babcock*
Ahrtracl
We estimate the influence of policy-induced price changesand of technologysupply on
North Carolina flue-cured tobacco yields. The decline in land rent and effective output price that
accompanied a 1965 policy change from acreage allotments to poundage quotas caused a 12 percent
decrease in yields. Farmer yields were more responsive to yield-increasing technologies under
acreage allotments than under poundage quotas. Annual yield growth was 0.5 percent under
poundage quotas and 4.32 percent under acreage allotments. The growth rate decline is attributable
to changes in relative prices and to a slowdown in the supply of available technologies.
Key Words: commodity policy, endogenous yield growth, flue-cured tobacco, technical change.
Government programs affect agricultural
supply through their influence on farmer incentives.
Studies of the supply effects of U. S. commodity
policy have focused on land diversions and
aggregate acreage response (e.g., Lee and
Helmberger; Houck and Ryan; and Tegene,
Huffman, and Miranowski). The influence of
commodity programs on per-acre yields commonly
is considered temporary, with yields changing as
differing land qualities are diverted (Love and
Foster; Hoag, Babcock, and Foster; Rausser,
Zilberman, and Just; Weisgerber). The relation
between government-altered incentives and long-
term yield growth due to the adoption of new
technologies has received little empirical attention,
Our objective is to determine how
government programs affect levels and growth rates
of commodity yields. We investigate whether yield
growth imputed to technical change depends upon
policy-induced changes in relative prices. We use
an index of available technology derived from
research-station data to account for technical
change. This index is used instead of the usual time
trend because a simple trend captures the influence
of both innovation supply and adoption rates. An
index of available technology allows us to separate
the influence of new technologies from the effects
of new technologies and adoption decisions. 1
Tobacco is well-suited to this investigation.
Because the tobacco program is the only commodity
program with criminal penalties for noncompliance,
it is the only program with complete participation.
Therefore, empirical evidence of government
influence on yields should be more evident for
tobacco than for other commodities. And, flue-cured
tobacco serves as an ideal case study to measure the
response of yields to policy change. The federal
flue-cured tobacco program has undergone a number
of important changes since its inception in 1938
(Grise and Griffin). Foremost is the 1965 change
from acreage allotments to poundage quotas as the
principal means of controlling supply. Additionally,
a focus on North Carolina flue-cured tobacco, which
accounts for 65 percent of U. S. output, allows the
use of Babcock and Foster’s (1991) measures of the
supply of yield-increasing technologies. We use
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these measures along with factor prices, some
influenced by government intervention, to estimate
a derived yield-supply function for North Carolina
flue-cured tobacco from 1955 to 1987. The
estimated function is used to determine how
government intervention affects yields over this
period.
The Growth in Tobacco Yields: 1954-1987
Between 1954 and 1987, per-acre tobacco
yields in North Carolina increased at an average rate
of 1.9 percent per year. In contrast, the average
annual growth of North Carolina com yields over
the same period was 5.3 percent. Given the ample
evidence of changes in tobacco farming practices
(e.g., Johnson, pp. 73-95), one may attribute much
of the growth in tobacco yields to development and
adoption of technological advances, in much the
same way as previous studies explained increases in
corn and in other crop yields (e.g., Griliches). As
demonstrated in figure 1, the pattern of growth
between 1954 and 1987 for tobacco yields clearly is
different from that of com yields. Tobacco yield
growth rates were markedly higher in the period
before 1965 (averaging 4.1 percent per year) than in
the period after 1964 (0.8 percent per year). In
contrast, before 1965 corn yields increased at an
average rate (5.7 percent) very similar to that after
1965 (5,0 percent).
One explanation for the decline in yield
growth rates for tobacco is that the potential gains
from adopting previous major innovations were
exhausted, and no new major advances were
developed. Traditionally, one represents the growth
of a commodity’s per-acre yield, in response to the
introduction of a technical advance, as following an
S-shaped adoption curve (Davies; Griliches; and
Mansfield). Diffusion of the advance across
producers (and thus growth in aggregate yields)
begins slowly, proceeds rapidly, and slows as the
advance reaches all potential adopters. In any year,
minor technical innovations may shift the diffusion
curve upward, but without continual major advances
growth rates of aggregate yields eventually decline
as diffusion slows, The exhaustion of previous
innovations in tobacco production and a slowdown
in discovery of new innovations would lead to a
decline in yield growth rates.
An alternative explanation for the decline
in yield growth lies in the macroeconomic response
of the tobacco producer to changes in government
policy, One specific change is the focus of this
article. Before 1965, the federal program for flue-
cured tobacco controlled market supplies by
restricting the amount of land planted to tobacco
both nationally and within individual counties (Grise
and Griffin). Growers could alter the scale of their
tobacco enterprises by buying and selling acreage
allotments within their county until 1963 and,
beginning in i963, they also could lease allotments
for one year. Rents generated by supply restrictions
were reflected in the amount that growers were
willing to pay for tobacco land allotments. In 1965,
the program adopted the present direct supply-
control system using poundage quotas that restricts
the extent of marketing both nationally and by
producers within a county. Since the program
change, growers have been able to alter the scale of
their enterprises by buying, leasing, or selling
pounds of quota.2 After the program change,
economic rents no longer were tied to land. Rather,
they were bid into the quota lease value.
The first explanation for the continual
decline in yield growth rates was rejected by Foster
and Babcock. Time series evidence supports the
hypothesis that a sudden decline in both yield levels
and growth rates commenced in 1965. The
economic incentives causing this sudden change are
the focus of this investigation, the first step of
which is the development of a conceptual model of
producer decisions under government intervention.
Per-acre Tobacco Yields and Policy Change
Yields respond to price changes and to
changes in available technologies. The extent to
which newly-available, yield-increasing technologies
are adopted and alter actual yields may depend upon
prices, which are, in turn, influenced by government
policy. In an environment of exogenous technology
supply, policies that change incentives affect yields
in two ways. First is the direct effect of changes in
relative prices when available technology is held
constant. Second is the altered response of actual
yields to exogenous technological advance.
More formally, let Y(P I~) be the farmer’s
optimal yield at prices, P, given the set of
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Figure 1. Average Annual Growth Rates for Tobacco and Corn in North Carolina.
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exogenously available technologies, r Three
comparative static results are of interest: a) The
effect of a change in some price Pi for a given
technology, aY/aP; b) the effect of a change in
available technology for constant prices, aY/a~; and
c) the change in the yield response to technology
with respect to a change in a price, 8YIMIPP
We consider first the effects of government
policy changes on yields when technology is held
constant, A tobacco grower’s net revenue, NR, can
be represented as
NR = A[P# - C(Y,A IT) - r], (1)
where A is acreage planted, PT the effective price
per-unit of output, C(Y, A I‘t) the minimum per-
acre cost of producing Y on A acres with available
technology ~, and r the per-acre rental rate of
tobacco-growing land. We assume that C(Y, A IT)
is locally convex in Y and A, conditional on
available technology, ~. Before 1965, land rental
rates, r, captured the rents generated from supply
controls. Following Moschini and Babcock and
Foster (1992), we decompose the effective price
facing the producer, PT, into the difference between
market price, P.,, and per-pound quota rent, q: f’T=
Pm- q. Before 1965, there was no market for quota
poundage (q = O): thus, the effective output price
was simply the expected market price. After the
program change, quota lease rates, q, capture the
program rents. The effects of moving from acreage
restrictions to poundage quotas can be represented
by a decrease in r and a concurrent increase in q,
In any given year, the grower maximizes
NR through choice of Y and A. Thus, the marginal
conditions PT = W/aY and [Z(PT,AIT) - r] =
A&C/aA are implied, where X(PTA Iz) is the
grower’s per-acre return over nonland costs for a
given level of acreage and a given technology: n =
PTY- C(Y, A IT). Note that &@PT = Y when the
marginal conditions are met. In equilibrium, PT and
r will be such that there are zero rents earned by a
grower–-n(PT,AIT) = i-a relation implying that
costs per acre are minimized: aC/aA = O. The
maintenance of this equilibrium condition implies a
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relation between output prices and land rental rates,
which is found by totally differentiating the
equilibrium condition n(P~~ IZ) = r:
The zero-profit condition and the solution
to the grower’s optimization problem, az/i3A = -
aC/i3A = O, imply that dP,/dr = I/Y. The following
comparative static results follow immediately:
dY _ Y-’ C*A
> 0, and
~- A
dA -Y-’ CYA>
—= <OasCY~~O,
d’ A
where A = CYYc~~ _ c~r > 0 from
assumed convexity of the cost function.
(2)
(3)
the
When it is assumed that land rental rates
and output prices adjust to maintain zero grower
profits, a relaxation of acreage allotments with a
subsequent increase in output price results in an
unambiguous decrease in per-acre yield. The sign
of the acreage effect due to decreased rental rates is
ambiguous, however: it depends upon how acreage
affects per-acre marginal costs. If they decrease
(increase) with an increase in land cultivated, then
a decrease in land rental rates results in a decrease
(increase) in acreage. These results give the total
effect on yields and on acreage levels from a
change in rental rates with a corresponding change
in expected output price to maintain equilibrium.
The partial effects of changing rental rate
and output price at an initial zero profit equilibrium
are as follows:
c - CyAY/A
~= AAA’
(4)
(5)
aA _ CyyY/A - CYA
, and (6)
~- A
aA _ -A-~c YY (7)
~“ A “
Note that the partial effects on yields and
on acreage levels from a change in effective output
price depend, in part, upon how per-acre marginal
costs change with total acres. The necessary
condition (CY~< O)for yield levels to decrease with
increased land rental rates (holding P and -T
constant) is the sufficient condition for both yield
and acreage levels to increase with effective output
price (with r and ~ held constant). Coefficient
estimates obtained by regressing yields on rental
rates and on output prices while controlling for
available technology and for other variables can be
interpreted as the partial changes given by (4) and
(5).
In a competitive market for tobacco
acreage alIotment, tobacco land rental rates would
fall ceteris paribus with the elimination of acreage
restrictions. With a decrease in land rental rates,
growers would earn economic profits without a
corresponding decline in the net price that they
receive for their output (if all other factors have
perfectly elastic supplies). Three responses may
occur to decrease grower prices: the production of
individual growers may increase, which would
increase aggregate production and thus lower market
price; the number of growers may increase, which
would lead to the same expansion; and growers may
bid up the poundage lease rates (effectively
lowering their output price), If aggregate
production is fixed annually by policy, as it has
been since 1965, then equilibrium is reattained by
increased poundage lease rates, thus the per-unit
effective price received by growers is decreased,
and all growers, the number of whom is variable,
once again would receive zero profits.
Restricting the total amount of land
available for production increases the per-unit cost
of tobacco land relative to the cost of other inputs.
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When the index of available technology is held
constant, a higher price for tobacco land (with a
subsequently increased output price to maintain zero
profits) gives growers the incentive to use their land
more intensively by applying greater per-acre
amounts of nonland inputs and by increased
adoption of available yield-increasing technologies.
Moving from restrictions on total land use to
restrictions on total amount of tobacco that can be
sold would reduce the price of land relative to
nonland inputs and decrease the effective output
price (consumer price less quota lease rate). The
altered incentives facing individual growers would
induce increased use of land and decreased use
nordand resources to produce the same amount of
aggregate output.
It is less evident how price changes affect
the responsiveness of yields to new technologies
becoming available over time. If adoption rates are
independent of prices, as is commonly assumed in
empirical work (e.g., Ball), then a2Y/&& = O.
Rejection of this independence hypothesis would be
evidence supporting the idea that policies affect the
rate at which yield-increasing technologies are
adopted, as hypothesized by Rausser, Zilberman and
Just, The extent to which tobacco yields are altered
by relative price changes for given technologies and
by responses to newly-available technologies is
determined in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Estimating the Growth in Tobacco Yields
In the preceding conceptual analysis, we
concentrated on the yield effects of changes in land
rental rates and in output price—the two price
variables most directly influenced by government
policy–and of available technologies. In the
subsequent regression analysis, we also include
wage rates and an index of all other input prices.
The per-acre tobacco yield data, output and input
prices, and technology-related data are presented in
table 1. The yield data are county-average yields
for 10 representative counties in North Carolina.s
County yields are an appropriate level of
aggregation because the tobacco program forbids
cross-county sale or lease of flue-cured tobacco
allotments. Thus, growers within a county face a
common rental rate for tobacco land before 1965
and a common grower output price after the 1965
program change.
Beginning in 1954, North Carolina State
University began its Official Flue-cured Tobacco
Cultivar Variety Trials (NCOVT). Data became
available documenting new varietal development,
i.e., genetic innovations, and changes in prevailing
production technologies i.e., non-genetic input
innovations.4 Babcock and Foster (1991) developed
measures of the potential effects of technical change
on flue-cured tobacco yields using NCOVT data.
From these data we derive an index for use in a
seemingly unrelated regression analysis to explain
the contribution of available technology to actual
county yields before and after the change from
acreage allotments to poundage quotas. The index
is derived as follows.
For each growing region, variety trials are
conducted on research-station plots, Production
practices on the stations are updated periodically to
reflect prevailing practices within the different
growing regions. These changes in production
practices on the research stations have increased
yields independently of the development of new
varieties (Bowman, et al.; Babcock and Foster
[199 1]). Region-specific technology indexes (equal
to 1 in 1955) were obtained from Babcock and
Foster’s (199 I) regression coefficients relating
logged yields of new varieties to logged time. The
index values for a year are associated with the next
year’s actual production to reflect that new varieties
tested in one year are available for release the next
year. This index is a comprehensive measure of
available technology, and reflects the contribution of
both genetic and non-genetic innovations.
We obtained pre-1963 rental rates for
North Carolina tobacco acreage from Seagraves’ ex
post analysis of the Eastern Belt for 1954 to 1962.
Relevant land rents for this analysis are actual per-
acre rental rates determined before planting, These
ex ante rental rates are based most appropriate y on
expected prices and on expected weather that will
occur during the growing season. Because support
prices are announced before planting, there is little
uncertainty about output price, so we made no price
adjustments. But. ex post return data are influenced
great]y by yields, which in turn depend upon the
realization of growing season weather. Therefore,
we transformed Seagraves’ ex post data to e.xante
data by eliminating weather variations from
Seagraves’ yield data. The resulting estimates of
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Table 1, Data Used m the RegressIon Analysis’
Year
I955
1956
1957
1958
1959
19rM
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1914
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
19s4
1985
1986
1987
Y]eldb
(Ibslac)
1473.9
1666.5
1496.6
1709.4
151749
1830.0
1791.8
1909.4
I979.4
2281.6
1797.6
1837.5
2025.3
1820.5
1799.0
2042.5
2097.5
1970.0
2088.0
1958.0
1909.0
2025.5
1838.5
2024.5
1875.0
I945.0
2126,0
2098.5
1916.5
2159.0
2193.5
2058.0
2037.5
output
Pnceb
($itb)
1.28
1.30
1.30
1.35
1.36
1.37
1.36
1.37
1.36
1.38
1.21
1.18
1.22
1.22
1.24
1.20
1.16
1.12
0.99
0.93
0.88
0.90
0.96
0.87
0.71
0.72
0,74
0.68
0.62
0.57
0.71
0.77
0.70
Land
Rent’
Wac)
352.25
316.02
368.81
452.08
464.23
545.69
646.36
537.06
569.12
579.47
45.26
43.65
43.17
40.97
37.73
36.75
35.29
33.97
28.85
28.16
26.08
26.48
32.65
28.62
26.59
24.90
22.83
22.96
23.85
22.78
27.05
22.08
17.92
Wages
($lwk)
62.55
68.14
68.03
63.38
67.92
68.66
70.01
72.37
71.61
76.50
78.96
83.44
90.38
100.04
105.43
108.47
111.95
106.95
97.85
96.96
94.71
99.66
100.00
104.94
98.67
96.27
91.70
98.66
99.31
104.15
109.11
123.35
130.55
Technology Indexesc
Eaa[ Border Old
1Ml 1.00 1.00
1.10 1.10 1.16
1.17 1.17 1.26
1.22 1.22 1.34
1.26 1.26 1.41
1.29 1.29 1.46
1.32 1.32 1.51
1.35 1.35 1.55
1.37 1.37 1.59
1.39 1.39 1.63
1.41 1.41 1.66
1.43 1.43 1,69
1.45 1.44 1.72
1.46 1.46 1.75
1.48 1.47 1.78
1.49 1.49 1.80
1.50 1.50 1.82
1.52 1.51 1.85
1.53 1.52 1.87
1.54 1.53 1.80
1.55 1.55 1.91
1.56 1.56 1.93
1.57 1.57 1.94
1.58 1.58 1.96
1.59 1.58 2.98
1.60 1.59 2.(XI
1.61 1.60 2.01
1.62 1.61 2.03
1.62 1.62 2.04
1.63 1.63 206
1.64 1.63 2.07
1.65 1.64 2.08
1.65 1.65 2.10
“At] prices are deflated by the preducer prices pad index, 1977
= 100.
bAverage of 10 counties.
‘1954 = 1.00.Tbe Eaatem Belt courmes are Johnston, Pitt, Lenoir,
and Halifax. Cumberland and Robeson are the two Border Belt
counoes, and Wake, Stokes, Granville, and Guilford are the Old
Belt counties.
per-acre rental rates are based on net revenue
calculations: they reflect no actual transaction data
and may exclude some relevant costs, We therefore
calibrated the adjusted Seagraves’ estimates with
data from a 1962 survey of acreage rental rates
(Bordeaux, Hoover and Toussaint). This calibration
was accomplished by multiplying the deweatherized
Seagraves estimates by 0,63,s Data for 1963 come
directly from 1963 survey data (Bordeaux, Hoover
and Toussaint), No land rental rate data were
available for 1964, so the 1963 level was adjusted
upward according to the percentage increase in
average flue-cured tobacco prices from 1963 to
1964.
The adjusted and extended Seagraves rental
rate data represent the per-acre retumg to tobacco
growing in a typical Eastern Belt county. To obtain
county-specific rental rate data requires estimation
of the relative return to tobacco growing in each
county in the sample. We used post-1964 poundage
lease rates to estimate county-specific acreage rental
rates for 1955 to 1964. Per-pound lease rate data
(discussed in detail below) are available beginning
in 1965. These lease rates reflect per-pound
production cost differences between counties.
Average per-pound lease rates for 1965 to 1967 for
each county were multiplied by average yields from
1955 to 1964 for each county to obtain county-
specific estimates of per-acre net revenues.
Estimates of county-specific acreage rental rates
from 1955 to 1964 were obtained by multiplying the
adjusted and extended Seagraves series by the ratio
of a county’s net revenue, as indicated by average
yields and per-pound lease rates, to Pitt County’s
net revenue estimate.fi Pitt County was selected as
the numeraire county because it has the greatest
estimated net revenue.
Discussions with tobacco extension
specialists at North Carolina State University led us
to concl ude that there is no shortage of land suitable
for growing flue-cured tobacco in North Carolina.
Furthermore, many soil types are suitable. Thus,
the relevant land rental rates after the change from
acreage alIotments to poundage controls in 1965 is
the prevailing rental rate for all agricultural crops.
Average North Carolina farmland rental rates for the
period 1965-87 were obtained from USDA
publications (USDA, ERS a,b). County adjustments
were made by lmultiplying the state average by the
ratio of county average corn yields to state average
corn yields from 1965 to 1987.7
Average agricultural field work wages were
obtained from NCDA. An index of all other input
prices served as a deflator. This index is the USDA
producer prices paid index for all production items,
excluding wages and interest rates.
The appropriate grower output price is the
expected effective price of tobacco with the
expectation taken before planting. Before the 1964
program change, grower price was expected market
price. After the change, the appropriate price was
expected market price less the per-pound quota
lease rate, which is known before planting.
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Expected market price over this period is fairly
certain because the support price of tobacco is
known prior to planting. Regressing observed
market price, Pn,f,on support price, S,, and lagged
market price yields this estimated prediction
equation (with t-statistics in parentheses) for the
expected market price, P;:
P; q 0,05 + 0.07Pr1,-, +0.95S, R2 = 0.99.
(2.89) (0.64) (8.55)
Per-pound quota lease rates for the 10
counties for 1966-69 and for 1977-87 are from Pugh
and Hoover, and from Toussaint. Estimates of lease
rates for 1965 were obtained from Hoover’s
estimates of lease rate averages for the tobacco
growing belts. Estimates for the missing data for
1970-76 were obtained by regressing known lease
rates against tobacco support prices, land rental
rates, real wages, a time index, and county-specific
intercept terms. Predicted values from the
regressions were used for 1970-76. The data set
was not extended beyond 1987 because transactions
costs of off-farm leasing of tobacco increased when
the lease and transfer provision of the tobacco
program was eliminated.
To account for a portion of the yield
variation caused by random variables, monthly
rainfall amounts were included in the regressions,
Rainfall-squared terms also were included to
account for possible decreasing returns from
rainfall. Because of the high probability of
correlated error terms across counties, the 10 yield
equations were estimated as seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR). The null hypothesis of a
diagonal covariance matrix between equations was
rejected at the 0.01 significance level. The
quadratic functional form was used to allow for
interaction between prices and technology. No
interaction terms involving the rainfall variables
were included, County-specific differences not
accounted for by the explanatory variable are
captured by county-specific intercepts, The response
of yields to rainfall, prices and technology was
restricted to be the same across the 10 counties,
are presented in table 2. The county-specific
intercepts and the R2 values are reported in table 3.
The ten-county average of actual and expected
yields from the regression results are illustrated in
figure 2. Expected yields in figure 2 were obtained
by fixing rainfal 1 variables at mean levels.
Expected yields increased rapidly from 1955 to
1964, increasing at an average annual rate of 4.3
percent. In i965, expected yields decreased by
approximately 250 pounds. After this 12 percent
decline, expected yields increased at an average
annual rate of 0.5 percent. Note that over the entire
sample, expected and actual yields attained their
maximum value in 1964, immediately before the
program change. The null hypothesis that yields are
determined solely by technology and rainfall is
strong]y rejected (X2 = 43,61 with 12 degrees of
freedom]. We now turn to a discussion of price and
technology components contributing to this path of
yield growth.
Table 2.Seemmgly Unrelated Regression Results
Variable’ Estimated COefOc]enr f-statlstlc
7 -333.8 0.22
@ 178.44 0.43
r -9.189 2.38
# 0.MKJ53 1.27
PT -1803.0 1.64
P; -42.641 0.17
w -38.931 1.33
~2 0.1266 1.14
r. 7 1.018 2.32
w. ‘I -0.772 0.17
PT. T 108. I1 0.29
PT. r 3,4315 1.16
PTW 14.395 1.85
r,w 0.0425 2.42
May 9.512 0.88
May2 -2.2643 2.05
June 12.973 1.98
Junez -1.894 3.66
July 40.858 6.05
JU1Y2 -2.764 5.64
Results
The estimated coefficients from the
quadratic function using SUR for the 10 counties
The vsriable definitions are: Y - tobacco yields per acrq PT - the
effective per-pound price of tobacco; r - the per-am mntai rate
for tobacco-growing land ‘t - m index of avsiiable technologies,
arrd w - weekly price of agricultural labar.
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Table 3. Constant Terms and Individurd County R*’s
County Intercept r-statistic R*
Wake 4790.7 2.25 0.78
Cumberland 4917.9 2.30 0.75
Robescm 5019.7 2.35 0.74
Johnston 5043.9 2.36 0.76
Guilford 4669.4 2.20 0.65
Pitt 4984.3 2.33 0.51
Lenou 5105.3 2.39 0.50
Stokes 4620,6 2.17 0.59
Granville 4578.0 2.15 0.53
f-fafifax 4985.2 2.33 0.50
..—
Figttre 2. Predicted and Average Nortft Carolina Tobacco Yields
Z,’orj
2000
1800
1600
Ibs/ac
1 I&county aetuel yields
—
ii
ii
~.
A
1C-county predbtad yields
1’
/
1400&- I I I I I I
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Year
Note: Predktsd yields were cateulated at the mean vatues of the rainfal vatisbles.
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To gain insight into the comparative statics
results in equations (2), (4), and (5) we test the
statistical significance of the derivatives of yields
with respect to output and input prices. Of
particular interest is the hypothesis that dY/dr >0,
i.e., allowing grower output price to equilibrate.
We are also interested in the signs of d2Y/hdPi,
where Pi represents output and input prices. Certain
statistical tests require that test statistics be
evaluated at a set data point, One obvious setting
would be to fix the data at their mean values for the
entire sample period 1955-87. But average levels of
the data are a combination of two quite different
policy regimes. It is reasonable to expect that the
response of yields to the exogenous variables
depends upon the prices existing in each policy
regime. The pre-1965 regime had high land and
grower output prices; whereas the post- 1964 regime
had low land and output prices. An alternative
method of testing the hypotheses is to evaluate the
null hypotheses at average land and tobacco prices
under each of the two regimes. Results of these
tests for the two policy regimes and the entire
sample period are given in table 4. The two
alternative data points are the sample mean prior to
1965 for land rental rates and tobacco prices, and
the sample mean for years after 1964 for land rental
rates and tobacco prices. The price of labor and the
technology index are held constant at their sample
means for all hypothesis tests.
As can be seen in table 4 the sign of
dY/dP, is not significantly different from zero at the
pre-1965 level of datw it is significantly negative
after 1964; but it is not significantly different from
zero for the entire sample. These test results should
be contrasted with the null hypothesis that P~ has no
explanatory power in the regression, a hypothesis
rejected at the 0.10 significance level (X2 = 9.46
with five degrees of freedom). These empirical
results indicate that the marginal cost of per-acre
yields increases with acreage, (CY~ > 0 from
equation [4]) only from 1965 to 1987.
sample. But the null hypothesis that r has no
explanatory power in the regression is rejected at
the 0.01 significance level (~’ = 38.37 with five
degrees of freedom). These results suggest that if
CYAis positive, it also is small.
The sign of dY/& is significantly positive
over the entire sample period and for the subsample
from 1955 to 1964; for the period 1965 to 1987, it
is smaller with a larger confidence interval. The
null hypothesis that I has no explanatory power in
the regression is rejected at the 0.05 significance
level (%2= 12.88 with five degrees of freedom).
The implied elasticity of yields with respect to the
index of available technology is 0.54 for the early
period and 0,23 for the latter, a fact imp]ying that
the responsiveness of yield to available technology
is about half as great after the 1965 program change
as it was before.
Although we have no comparative statics-
based hypotheses regarding the relation of yields
with wage rates, w, ~Y/~wis positive and significant
between 1955 and 1964, but insignificant for the
latter subperiod and for the entire sample. The null
hypothesis that w has no explanatory power in the
regression is rejected at the 0.05 significance level
(X2= 11.22 with five degrees of freedom).
From these results, we can conclude that
the rapid growth in yields from 1955 to 1964
(figure 2) can be attributed to increasing land prices,
wage rates, and yield potentials of available
technology (see table I). The abrupt decline in
expected yields in 1965 was coincident with a 92
percent decline in land rental rates with the
corresponding drop in grower output price of 12
percent. The comparative statics shown in equation
(2) imply that decreases in land rental rates result in
decreased yields when output prices adjust to
maintain zero profits, To calculate the equilibrium
effects of changes in rental rates or expected output
price, note that
The sign of dY/& is ambiguous. It is
positive but statistically insignificant at standard dY _ dY ayy.l = $y.1,
confidence levels under the 1955-64 regime of high -X-F+=
land rental rates and tobacco prices; it is negative
and statistically insignificant under the 1965-87 This theoretical finding is strongly
regime of low rental rates and tobacco prices; and supported empirically by using the mean land rent
it is negative and insignificant over the entire and the output price for 1955 to 1964, with a t-
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Table 4. llypotbesis Tests for the Seemingly llnrclated Regression Mrxicl”
Null Hypoil)esis: al’/W, = o dY/th = o aY/zh+, = o dY/ik = O dl’/dPT = O dY/(1”= O
Periodb Nonequilib[ium Changesc Equilibrium Changes’
1955-1987
Test Value !24.46 408.67 3,04 -0.323 -49593 -026
f Statistic 0,34 2.41 0.99 -0.25 -0.23 (),23
1955- 1964
lest Value 1083.3 729,11 19.076 0908 2824.2 I 47
( - Slntistic 0.91 3,45 2.89 143 4.67 467
1965- 1987
Test value -292.14 270,24 -3.825 -0833 -1890.4 -0.99
I Statistic -2.71 I .40 .(),99 -0.52 -0.61 -0.61
“Variable definitions are given in table 2.
~hc data levels used in the lest statistics are the mean Icvcls over the entire sample for all variables with (he exception of the prkc of tobacco
and land rental roles which are set to their memr over time period indicated
‘Nonequilibrium changes are those where al [ other variables are held cons[ant
‘F,,uilibtium changes are those where the zero-profit condition is maintained.
statistic of 4.66 (table 4). The point estimate of
dY/dr at the average land rent and the output price
for the years immediately before and after the
policy change (1964 and 1965) is 1.42 with a t-
statistic of 3.92. This is strong evidence that the
concurrent decreases in land rent and output price
that were brought about by the policy change
decreased yield levels. Cheaper tobacco-growing
land, caused by the move from acreage allotments
to poundage quotas, lowered the cost of extensive
production (use of more land) relative to that of
intensive production (increasing yields).~ After the
program change, increases in rental rates had
insignificant effects on yields. After the drop in
yield levels in 1965, expected yields continued their
upward trend. The yield increases after the program
change can be attributed to continued, but slower,
increases in potential yield as measured by the
index of available technology.
Under the null hypothesis that the response
of yields to changes in available technology is
independent of policy, the interaction term between
land rental rates and technology is zero. The
coefficient of this interaction term is 1.018 with a t-
statistic of 2.32. Thus, we can conclude that when
quotas are tied to acreage (with concurrent increases
in land prices), the response of yields to changes in
available technology is greater than when quotas are
not tied to land. This finding is consistent with the
hypothesis that adoption rates of yield-increasing
technologies are correlated positively with the price
of land relative to other factor prices. As can be
seen in table 2, the estimated coefficients on the
interaction terms between the technology index and
both output price and wages are insignificantly
different from zero. This result implies that the
determining factor in the responsiveness of yields to
available technology is land rents.
Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrated how
changes in federal tobacco policy affected levels
and growth of flue-cured tobacco yields. We
investigated whether yield growth attributed to
technical change depends upon policy-induced
changes in relative prices. This study is relevant to
other commodities when government intervention
influences land and output prices. We used an
index of available technologies that was derived
from research-station data and that allowed us to
distinguish yield effects of new technologies
supplied and overall effects of new technologies and
adoption decisions.
To summarize the empirical results,
tobacco yield levels and the responsiveness of yields
to changes in available technology depend upon
price effects of program design. Specifically, the
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1965 drop in land rents and output price, resulting
from the shift from acreage allotments to poundage
quotas, decreased yield levels by 12 percent, In
addition, the movement to poundage quotas
decreased the responsiveness of yields to changes in
available technology. These findings are consistent
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with the hypothesis that high land prices lead to
high adoption rates of yield-increasing technologies.
The growth of expected yields declined from an
annual rate of 4.32 to 0.5 percent because of a
change in relative prices, a slowdown in the rate of
increase of available technologies, and a decrease in
the responsiveness of yields to those technologies,
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Endnotes
1. In this paper we do not address the issue of induced innovation, that is, the effect of changed incentives
on the supply of newly available technologies. We take the supply of available yield-increasing
technologies for tobacco as exogenously given, an assumption supported by the empirical findings of
Babcock and Foster (1991). We consider only endogenous adoption rates, which depend implicitly upon
levels of output and input prices. Two examples of related theoretical work on the connection between
government-altered price distributions and technological adoptions are Kim, Hayes, and Hallam, who show
that the stabilization of output prices will increase adoption rates of yield-increasing technologies for risk-
averse firms, and Miller and Tolley, who address the question of optimally choosing price supports and
input subsidies to affect the profitability of the new technology relative to an old technology, thus increasing
adoption rates.
2. Beginning in 1987 the “lease and transfer” provision of the flue-cured tobacco program was eliminated.
Since then, growers who lease tobacco quota must grow it on the farm of the quota owner.
3. The three primary growing regions or “belts” are represented by the 10 counties in this study. Pitt,
Johnston, Lenoir and Halifax Counties represent the Eastern Belt; Stokes, Guilford, Wake and Granville
Counties represent the Old Belt; and Robeson and Cumberland Counties represent the Border Belt,
4. The results from the NC OVT are published annual]y as a Department of Crop Science Research Report,
North Carolina State University.
5, Surveyed rental rate data for Pitt County in 1962 was $297, for Wilson County, $327, for an average of
$312. The weather-adjusted Seagraves estimate for 1962 is $495.75.
6. The resulting ratios are 0.92, 0.73, 0.74, 0,57, 0.61, 0.67, 0.91, 1.00, 0.97, and 0.73 for Robeson,
Cumberland, Wake, Guilford, Granville, Stokes, Johnston, Pitt, Lenoir, and Halifax Counties.
7. The hypothesis of time-invariant ratios of county com yields to state com yields could be rejected only
for Pitt County. The constant ratios used to adjust state farmland rental rates for Robeson, Cumberland,
Wake, Guilford, Granville, Stokes, Johnston, Lenoir, and Halifax Counties are 0.99,0.94,0.78,0.82, 0.71,
0.79, 0.87, 1.07, and 0.96. Fitted values from the following regression equation were used to adjust
farmland rental rates for Pitt County: YP/Y~c= 1.601-0.00726 T, where YP is the county com yield in
Pitt County, Y~c is the average state yield, and T is an annual time index that equals 65 in 1965. The t-
statistic on the time coefficient was -2.75.
8. A similar output effect was found by Beck for the case of laying hens in Australia. The imposition of
a hen quota in 1972 resulted in a 9.5 percent increase in the per-hen production of eggs.
